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GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION, AND PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Product diversification and its financial outcomes have been studied exhaustively. However, previous literature 
has focused on corporations, ignoring other important legal organizations or governance structures. In this paper, 
we study the diversification strategies of cooperatives and compare them with corporations. We develop 
hypotheses that predict that cooperatives differ from corporations with respect to the extent, type, and 
performance of product diversification. Data obtained from a sample of 118 cooperatives and corporations are 
used to test the hypotheses. We find significant differences between cooperatives and corporations. Therefore, 
our main conclusion is that governance structure does matter for product diversification and its performance. 
Other governance structures, besides corporations and cooperatives, and their influence in other areas, besides 
product diversification, could be promising directions for future research. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Product diversification is a central topic of research in business (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). Many 
empirical studies have been devoted to the performance outcomes of product diversification, but the findings are 
mixed (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). One of the reasons for these mixed findings may be differences in 
legal organization or governance structure of the companies (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998).1 However, the influ -
ence of the governance structure on product diversification and its financial outcomes has been rather neglected. 
The vast majority of studies are based on (public) corporations. No studies are available about the diver-
sification strategies of cooperatives. This is remarkable, since cooperatives still play an important role in many 
national economies and sometimes an even crucial one in specific sectors, like food and agriculture. Therefore, 
more insight into potentially value-creating or -destroying strategies of these companies seems important.  
In this paper, we try to answer two questions. First, do the diversification strategies of corporations and 
cooperatives differ? Second, do the diversification strategies of corporations and cooperatives have different 
implications for financial performance? After sketching the theoretical background, we develop three hypothe-
ses, which link governance structure, product diversification, and financial performance. Following a description 
of the methods, we present the results of an empirical test of the hypotheses, which is based on a sample of 118 
cooperatives and corporations. The results indicate that governance structure does matter for product diversifica-
tion and its financial outcomes. The final section of this paper contains a short discussion and conclusion. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Before going into the theories that explain product diversification and its relationship with performance, we first 
provide a brief description of the differences between corporations and cooperatives (see, e.g., Hendrikse and 
Veerman, 2001). 
Corporations have shareholders. The shares give them rights to the assets, including the rents, of the 
corporation. The shares can be traded with relative ease. The managers of corporations can but do not necessarily 
have to own shares of the firm. Cooperatives have members, who have rights to the assets, including the rents of 
the cooperative. The rights are difficult to transfer from one member to another. In addition, the members are 
suppliers or customers of the cooperative (or both). For example, in agriculture, farmers have formed coopera-
tives that buy, process, and market their produce and cooperatives that sell them supplies like animal feed and 
seeds (or cooperatives that do both). In retail, shopkeepers have formed cooperatives that supply them with 
products and services. Cooperatives are managed by managers who are usually not a member of the cooperative. 
 Literature that directly links cooperatives to product diversification is not available. However, clues 
might be found in existing perspectives that explain the choice of product diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 
1990; Montgomery, 1994; Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). These perspectives are rooted in different theo-
ries or paradigms, notably agency theory (Jensen, 1986), transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975), the 
resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959), industrial organization (Palepu, 1985) and strategic contin-
gency theory (Venkatraman, 1989). Of these five perspectives, agency theory, transaction cost economics and 
the resource-based view of the firm are the most promising, because they include factors that may discriminate 
between corporations and cooperatives. 
 According to the resource-based view, firms can have excess capacity in resources (Penrose, 1959). The 
resources can be redeployed in new businesses, which implies product diversification. Several types of resources 
                                        
1 The governance structure or legal organization comprises those organizational arrangements that determine 
how the company contracts with imp ortant stakeholders, such as buyers, suppliers, lenders, and investors (Bethel 
and Liebeskind, 1998). 
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can be used for diversification (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). A priori, no differences with respect to physi-
cal and intangible assets can be expected, but, in general, cooperatives have less financial resources than corpora-
tions. Specifically, cooperatives can only generate additional equity by retaining earnings and obtaining extra 
funds from the limited pool of members. In contrast, corporations can retain earnings and raise extra equity in the 
stock market from any investor who is willing to take the risk. Consequently, cooperatives may have fewer 
means to diversify than corporations. 
 Agency theory suggests that firms diversify because their managers have personal motives to do so. 
Managers do not return free cash flows to shareholders, but spend them on diversification projects, because of 
motives like empire building, pay increases, and reduction of employment risk (Jensen, 1986). This is not in the 
interest of the shareholders, for instance because they can diversify risks themselves by building an efficient 
stock portfolio. However, in a corporation the interests of shareholders and managers can be aligned, for instance 
by granting stock options to managers, which could help to eliminate diversification projects that destroy value. 
This instrument is not available in a cooperative. In addition, risk reduction through product diversification might 
actually be in the interest of the members of the cooperative, since a large portion of their wealth is tied to the 
cooperative. 
 Finally, according to transaction cost economics, firms diversify to realize benefits that are costly to 
realize through market transactions. The most important benefits of product diversification are economies of 
scope and economies of internal capital markets (Jones and Hill, 1988). Economies of scope arise when the costs 
of jointly producing two products are lower than the costs of producing them separately (Teece, 1982). In an 
internal capital market, the corporate headquarters attracts cash flows, reallocates them to the most attractive 
investment proposals of the divisions, and monitors their deployment (Williamson, 1975). This is presumed to 
result in superior allocation and policing, compared with the external capital market. Related-diversified corpo-
rations are able to realize economies of scope and economies of internal capital markets, though not simultane-
ously, because the required administrative mechanisms are conflicting (e.g., Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). 
Unrelated-diversified corporations can only attain economies of internal capital markets (Jones and Hill, 1988). 
Depending on their type of diversification, cooperatives may also be able to realize the two types of benefits. 
However, the benefits of internal capital markets may be more restricted, since, as argued earlier, cooperatives 
cannot obtain equity from the stock market to allocate to attractive investment proposals. 
 
HYPOTHESES  
 
Departing from the theoretical framework, we formulate three hypotheses, one for the level, one for the type, and 
one for the performance of product diversification. Each hypothesis compares cooperatives with corporations. 
As explained earlier, cooperatives have less financial resources than corporations. Both can get, for ex-
ample, bank loans, but cooperatives are more restricted when it comes to equity. Therefore, given that coopera-
tives are not willing to sacrifice solvability and jeopardize the entire enterprise, they have fewer funds to start 
new activities. In contrast, corporations have better access to new equity. Moreover, they can use their own stock 
to pay for acquisitions. Consequently, for corporations it is easier to start new activities, including activities in 
different industries. 
An additional argument can be found in the interests the shareholders and members have in the corpora-
tion and cooperative. Shareholders are primarily interested in the future profitability of the corporation, which is 
the basis for dividends and stock value. As a consequence, they are prepared to ratify any activity that is ex-
pected to improve profitability, including activities in a new industry. Members also have a stake in the future 
profitability of the cooperative. In addition, since they are suppliers or buyers of the cooperative (or both), they 
are interested in obtaining more and cheaper inputs from the cooperative or selling more outputs at a higher price 
to the cooperative (or both). As a result, if they have to choose between, for example, an investment in an en-
largement of an existing plant that processes their output and an investment in a new industry, they might go for 
the first option. 
 Both arguments lead to hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Cooperatives are less diversified than corporations. 
 
Managers may prefer to diversify, even into activities that reduce the value of the firm, because of personal mo -
tives, like reduction of employment risk (Montgomery, 1994). Since the shareholders of a corporation have other 
means to reduce their risks, they are assumed to oppose this kind of diversification. By granting the managers 
stock options, the shareholders can bring them into line. The members of a cooperative do not have this instru-
ment at their disposal. Besides, they may actually have a preference for product diversification to reduce their 
risks. As mentioned in the theoretical background, a substantial portion of their wealth is tied to one cooperative. 
They cannot reduce their risks through small memberships in many cooperatives. The degree to which product 
diversification reduces risks depends on the correlation between the separate returns of the activities. The smaller 
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the coefficient of correlation between the returns, the lower the variability of total profits (Teece, 1982). Because 
the correlation between the returns of two unrelated activities is usually lower than the correlation between the 
returns of two related activities, unrelated diversification is more useful for risk reduction than related diversifi-
cation. In sum, if they diversify, we expect cooperatives to have a larger inclination to pursue unrelated product 
diversification than corporations. 
 Again, a second argument can be brought forward. In a corporation, the distribution of rents over the 
shareholders is straightforward, because it can be based on the number of shares each shareholder possesses. In a 
cooperative with only one activity, the distribution can also be relatively simple. For example, in a cooperative 
that processes milk, the financial benefits of a high price for the supplied milk can be distributed according to the 
number of gallons of milk each member supplies to the cooperative. This becomes more complicated when the 
cooperative diversifies into a related industry, such canned foods. In this case, it makes sense to combine specific 
activities, like logistics and marketing. However, the distribution of the resulting synergy gains over the various 
categories of members can no longer be based on a simple criterion, because one category of members supplies 
milk to the cooperative, whereas the other supplies (different kinds of) vegetables. In contrast, diversification 
into an unrelated activity, such as insurance, causes fewer problems for a cooperative, because of the absence of 
synergy gains. 
 Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cooperatives diversify relatively more into unrelated activities than 
corporations do. 
 
We would like to clarify that hypothesis 2 does not suggest that cooperatives diversify more into unrelated ac-
tivities than they do into related activities. Also, it does not indicate that cooperatives have a higher level of 
unrelated diversification than corporations. Instead, our expectation is that the ratio of unrelated diversification to 
total diversification is higher for cooperatives than it is for corporations. 
 Our final hypothesis concerns the influence of the type of product diversification on the financial per-
formance. For corporations, the type of diversification may not influence the financial performance. As discussed 
earlier, related-diversified corporations can realize economies of scope or economies of internal capital markets. 
They may opt for economies of scope, because these are based on the joint use of tangible or intangible re-
sources, which are, in general, more scarce than financial resources and could, thus, generate higher rents (Mont-
gomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). However, the costs involved in the realization of economies of scope are also 
relatively high. One of the reasons is that economies of scope entail strong interdependencies between activities, 
which obstruct the accountability of managers and necessitates the creation of a costly control structure (Jones 
and Hill, 1988). Unrelated-diversified corporations can only create economies of internal capital markets. The 
rents are relatively low, since economies of internal capital markets are based on beating the external capital 
market (Williamson, 1975), which is generally assumed to be quite efficient. However, the realization of econo-
mies of internal capital markets does not result in high costs, because, for example, interdependencies between 
activities are almost absent, so accountability is less difficult (Jones and Hill, 1988). For cooperatives, the situa-
tion could be slightly different. A priori, no differences might be expected with respect to economies of scope. 
However, cooperatives may not be in a position to fully realize economies of internal capital markets. Their 
headquarters can still allocate funds and monitor their use, but, given the restricted access to equity, there are 
only limited funds available. Consequently, unrelated-diversified cooperatives face extra costs and moderate 
benefits. 
 This leads to our final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The influence of unrelated diversification on financial performance 
is negative for cooperatives, while it is neutral for corporations. 
 
METHODS 
 
Successively, we briefly discuss the sample and data collection, the measures, and the analyses we used to test 
the hypotheses. 
 
Sample and data collection 
Both the sample and the data originate from REACH (Review and Analysis of Companies in Holland). REACH 
is an electronic database, which contains predominantly financial information about many Dutch companies. We 
selected all cooperatives that were part of the 1996 and 1997 editions of REACH. We chose these years, because 
they included the largest number of cooperatives and are still quite recent. For all cooperatives, we established 
the main activity and accompanying industry code, which is given by REACH. We then selected for each coop-
erative a corporation with exactly the same code. This helps to control for industry effects. If more corporations 
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were available, we randomly selected one. The resulting sample contains 118 companies, half of which are co-
operatives and half of which are corporations. 
 
Measures 
We used a dummy variable for the governance structure or legal organization. The variable has a value of zero 
for cooperatives and a value of one for corporations. 
To measure product diversification, we used an unweighted product-count measure. Unweighted prod-
uct-count measures are reliable, are easy to compute, and have low information requirements (Lubatkin, Mer-
chant, and Srinivasin, 1993; Montgomery, 1982). Weighted measures are more refined, but the breakdown of 
sales that is necessary to calculate the weights is not available. Besides, Lubatkin et al. (1993) find a strong cor-
respondence between product-count measures and Rumelt’s (1974) categorical measures, which supports the 
validity of product-count measures. Our measure of (total) product diversification is the number of different 
four-digit industries a company is active in. 
According to Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1987), unrelated diversification can be measured as the 
number of different two-digit industries a company is active in. We divided this number by (total) product diver-
sification to determine the ratio of unrelated diversification to total diversification. 
 Our measure of financial performance is accounting-based. No market-based measures are available for 
cooperatives. Also, accounting-based measures have a close connection to the decision variables controlled by 
managers. Besides, the majority of diversification studies have used accounting-based measures, ensuring that 
the results of this study build on and can be compared with a substantial body of work in this area (e.g., Robins 
and Wiersema, 1995). We chose return on total assets, for both 1996 and 1997. Return on total assets is less 
dependent on the capital structure of the firm than return on equity (Hill et al., 1992), which is an important 
consideration, given that cooperatives have limited access to equity. 
 Our study controls for company size and vertical integration. Control for size effects is very common in 
the diversification literature (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). Size may correlate with product diversification, 
governance structure, and firm performance. We used total company assets in 1996 and 1997 to measure size. 
Control for vertical integration is less common. A careful study of the companies in our sample revealed that 
many were active in industries that appeared to be unrelated, because the first two digits differed, but could in 
fact be quite related. For example, some of the cooperatives were active in both the production of animal feed 
and the trade in animal feed. We were afraid that, without controlling for this phenomenon, unrelated diversifi-
cation would appear to be linked to the governance structure, whereas in fact vertical integration was behind this 
link, because of correlations with both governance structure and unrelated diversification. Therefore, we in-
cluded a dummy variable for vertical integration, with a value of zero if there were no obvious vertical links 
between the activities of a company and a value of one if these links appeared to be present. 
 Naturally, we applied the usual transformations to the measures whenever this contributed to a better 
approximation of the normal distribution. 
 
Analysis 
We performed analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to test the first two hypotheses. The dependent variables were 
total diversification and the ratio of unrelated diversification to total diversification, respectively. In both cases, 
the factor was the governance structure and the covariates were total company assets and vertical integration. 
The analyses were performed for both 1996 and 1997. The third hypothesis was tested through multiple regres-
sion. Return on total assets was the dependent variable. The independent variables were the ratio of unrelated to 
total diversification and total company assets. Again, the analyses were performed for 1996 and 1997. 
  
RESULTS 
 
In this section, we briefly present the results  of preliminary analyses. The results of the ANCOVA analyses for 
the first hypothesis (see table 1) indicate that, while controlling for size and vertical integration, corporations and 
cooperatives significantly differ with respect to (total) product diversification (both in 1996 and 1997). On aver-
age, corporations were active in a mean number of 2.39 different (4-digit) industries, whereas this number was 
2.01 for cooperatives. Consequently, our first hypothesis is supported. 
The results of the ANCOVA analyses for the second hypothesis (see table 1, again) suggest that, while 
controlling for size and vertical integration, corporations and cooperatives also significantly differ regarding the 
ratio of unrelated diversification to total diversification (both in 1996 and 1997). On average, for corporations, 
the mean ratio of different unrelated (2-digit) industries to different 4-digit industries was 0.81, whereas this ratio 
was 0.86 for cooperatives. As a result, our second hypothesis is also supported. 
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Table 1. Results ANCOVA 
 Total product diversification Ratio of unrelated to  
total diversification 
 1996 1997 1996 1997 
 F p F p F p F p 
Factor for governance 
structure 
6.19 0.015 5.34 0.023 4.83 0.031 4.20 0.044 
Covariate for total 
company assets  
8.82 0.004 7.44 0.008 6.36 0.014 5.48 0.022 
Covariate for vertical 
integration 
24.26 0.000 24.13 0.000 0.38 0.542 0.40 0.528 
         
Average mean 
(standard deviation): 
    
Cooperatives 2.01 (1.47) 0.86 (0.23) 
Corporations 2.39 (1.79) 0.81 (0.28) 
 
 Finally, according to the outcomes of the multiple regression analyses for the third hypothesis (see table 
2 for some key results), corporations and cooperatives differ with respect to the influence of unrelated product 
diversification on financial performance. Specifically, the ratio of unrelated to total diversification has no signifi-
cant influence on the performance of corporations, while this ratio does have a negative influence on the per-
formance of cooperatives, for both 1996 and 1997. Therefore, we also found evidence to support the third hy-
pothesis. 
 
Table 2. Results multiple regression analyses 
 1996 1997 
 B (standard error) B (standard error) 
Cooperatives:   
Ratio of unrelated to total 
diversification 
-4.21 (1.63) **  -3.42 (1.51) * 
Total company assets  -0.30 (0.15) * -0.25 (0.14) † 
   
Corporations:   
Ratio of unrelated to total 
diversification 
-0.14 (0.74) -0.61 (0.83) 
Total company assets  0.15 (0.08) * 0.11 (0.09) 
† p ?  0.1, * p ?  0.05, ** p ?  0.01  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Although product diversification has been studied exhaustively, our knowledge of this important strategy is still 
incomplete. One of the gaps concerns the influence of the legal organization or governance structure on product 
diversification and its financial outcomes (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998). In this paper, we have tried to fill this 
gap by analyzing the differences with respect to diversification between two governance structures, corporations 
and cooperatives. Specifically, we set out to answer two questions: first, do the diversification strategies of cor-
porations and cooperatives differ, and second, do the diversification strategies of corporations and cooperatives 
have different implications for financial performance? 
The results of an empirical study of 118 companies indicate that both questions have affirmative an-
swers. Cooperatives are less diversified than corporations. When they diversify, cooperatives diversify relatively 
more into unrelated activities than corporations do. Finally, this unrelated diversification has a negative influence 
on the performance of cooperatives, whereas it has no influence on the performance of corporations. Coopera-
tives thus seem to follow strategies that may not be good for their financial health.  
For the substantial body of research into product diversification, an important implication of our study is 
that differences in governance structure may account for the mixed findings of the empirical tests of the diver-
sification-performance linkage. More in general, our study suggests that governance structure does matter. 
Therefore, other governance structures, besides corporations and cooperatives, and their influence in other areas, 
besides product diversification, could be promising directions for future research. 
What could prove to be an obstacle, is that the characteristics of the various governance structures may 
vary from country to country, depending on the different institutional environments. For example, a cooperative 
in the Netherlands may differ somewhat from a cooperative in the United States (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001). 
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This would limit the external validity of this study and of future studies dealing with governance structures. 
However, this certainly is not an issue that is unique to this specific area of research. 
Additional limitations of our study can be found in the measures we used. For product diversification, 
we used unweighted measures, which are less refined than weighted measures, like the entropy measure (Jac-
quemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985), and quite unsophisticated compared with measures inspired by the re-
source-based view (e.g., Farjoun, 1998; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Robins and Wiersema, 1995). For 
financial performance, we used return on total assets, which is acceptable for corporations. However, in case of 
cooperatives, return on total assets may be less appropriate, since the members also have an interest in outcomes 
other than profits, such as low prices for the inputs they obtain from the cooperative or high prices for the outputs 
they supply to the cooperative. The issue is perhaps alleviated by the fact that we have not made any predictions 
about the absolute financial performance of corporations versus that of cooperatives. Instead, our expectations 
concerned the direction of the influence of product diversification on financial performance. 
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